This paper evaluates the impact of privatization on rm employment using a panel dataset of 386 rms in China in the period 1995-2001. Controlling rm and year xed eects, our panel regressions nd that employment grows faster in privatized rms than in pure state-owned rms by a margin of 17.7 percentage points over the base year of 1995. We also study the dynamic impact of privatization on employment growth and nd that the performance of privatized rms improves over time. These ndings are robust even after we control other performance and nancial variables as well as the pre-privatization employment history of privatized rms. In addition, we employ the dierence-in-dierence propensity score matching method to check the robustness of our results. The estimates conrm the regression-based results.
1 Introduction rivtiztion hs een the most signint eonomi phenomenon in reent yers in ghinF fetween IWWS nd PHHRD SH perent of stteEowned enterprises @yisA were fully or prE tilly privtized @qrnutD ongD enevD nd oD PHHSAF ghin9s privtiztion progrmD if fully rried outD my e the lrgest industril ownership trnsformtion ever undertkenD eting more thn PHHDHHH yis nd IHH million urn workers @eiD relD nd rssnD PHHPAF feuse of the lrgeEsle employment in the yisD one onern out privtiztion is the potentil loss of employment nd its negtive impts on soil stilityF sn the period IWWSEPHHQD totl of RQFV million people lost their jos in the yi setor @qrnut et lFD PHHSD le RFIAF rivtiztion is esily piked up s the use for this mssive redution of employmentF o the extent tht there is high worker redundny in the yisD it seems legitimte to suspet tht privtiztion inevitly leds to mssive lyosF roweverD severl resons render this suspiion duiousF pirstD ghin implemented mssive struturl djustment in its industril setor in the midEIWWHsD trimming o exessive pities in industries tht overEsupplied their produts @suh s textileA nd mining ities tht rn out of resouresF his led to redution of employment in the yi setorF eondD fing growing ompetition from privte rmsD yis egn to implement poliy lled jianyuan zengxiao @utting the numer of employeesD improving eienyA in the midEIWWHsD resulting in mssive lyosF rivtized rms my lso redue the size of employmentD ut there is no prior reson to elieve tht they would ly o more workers thn yis didF his is relted to our lst reson onerning the eieny gins of privtiztionF ividene shows tht privtiztion hs led to signint improvements in rm eieny @un nd ongD PHHQY uD huD nd vinD PHHSY qrnutD ongD nd oD PHHTAF o the extent tht eieny leds I to rm expnsionD it is resonle to elieve tht privtized rms would mintin lower redution rte of employmentF ixisting empiril studies on other trnsition ountries provide mixed results regrding privtiztion9s impt on employmentF sing multiEountry smplesD qllD tonesD ndon nd ogelsng @IWWRAD wegginsonD xshD nd ndenorgh @IWWRAD nd foukri nd gosset @IWWVA ll nd tht employment inreses fter privtiztionD ut h9ouz nd wegginson @IWWWA ome to the opposite onlusionF 1 o frD there re few studies on the impt of privtiztion on employment in ghinF h9ouzD rssnD rel nd ei @PHHQA study PHV listed rms for the period IWWHEIWWU nd nd no signint hnge in employment shortly fter the listingD ut their employment delines signintly in the long runF fut this study just uses the iloxon signed rnk test @zEsttistiA to test the signine of the men hngeF yur pper ims t providing more urte nd more generl estimtes for the usl eet of privtiztion on employment in ghinF e use unique pnel dtset of QVT rms for the period IWWSEPHHIF his pnel dtset enles us to hndle the seletion prolem tht plgues most studies of privtiztion @hjnkov nd wurrellD PHHPAF o ssess the impt of privtiztion on employmentD we need to mke inferenes out employment tht would hve een oserved for privtized rms hd they not een privtizedF roweverD privtized rms might e seleted on the sis of employmentY for exmpleD it is possile tht rms with stronger potentil of growth re more likely to e privtized @quo nd oD PHHSAF his is euse politiins re onerned with unemployment nd inline to retin rms with the worst prospets in stte ownership to prevent possile lyosF yverlooking suh seletion prolems ould led to ises when we estimte the impt of privtiztion on employmentF he pnel struture of our dt enles us to use the xedEeet model to 1 D' Souza and Megginson (1999) have one Chinese rm in their sample. P eliminte seletion is due to time invrint unoservlesF sn the sene of genuinely rndomized experimentD the xedEeet pnel estimtion is nerly idel tool to tke re the seletion prolem of privtiztionF sn ddition to the xedEeet modelD we lso estimte the impt of privtiztion on employment y the diereneEinEdierene propensity sore mthing @hsh wA methodF elthough pplying xedEeet model ould lrgely redue seletion ises due to timeE invrint nd rmEinvrint unoservlesD hsh w method hs two dvntges over itF pirstD we do not need to impose the ssumption of liner funtionl form in the hsh w method s we do in the xedEeet modelF hen funtionl form restritions nnot e justied y eonomi theories or the dt generting proessD hsh w n led to more urte estimtes @heheji nd hD IWWVY mith nd oddD PHHHAF eondD hsh w reweighs the oservtions ording to preEdetermined weighting funtion over the ommon supportD while xedEeet estimtions rely on funtionl form to extrpolte outside the ommon supportF hen there is poor overlpping in the support etween privtized nd nonE privtized rmsD this rises questions on the roustness of the methods relying on funtionl forms to extrpolte outside the ommon support @frysonD horsettD nd urdonD PHHPAF yur desriptive nlysis shows tht oth yis nd privtized rms redued their employment in our smple periodF roweverD our eonometri studies show tht privtiztion leds to signintly less redution of employmentF he simple xedEeet estimte shows tht the overll enet of privtiztion is to inrese employment growth over the se yer of IWWS y IUFU perentge pointsF his eet dereses to IIFS perentge points when we ontrol rms9 ttriutes of nne nd performneD suggesting tht prt of the eet of privtiztion is sustntited through improving the rm9s nnil nd performne prmetersF Q e lso study the dynmis of the impt of privtiztion over time using oth the xedEeet pnel method nd the hsh w methodF he xedEeet pnel estimtes show tht privtiztion hs signintly positive eet on employment in the rst T yers fter privtiztionF he hsh w estimtes re smller thn the xedEeet estimtesD ut they follow the sme pttern of dynmisF e ondut roustness test to the lterntive interprettion tht privtized rms ly o workers efore privtiztion so they do not need to do lyos fter privtiztionF his mounts to dding in the pnel regressions preEprivtiztion yer dummies for the privtized rmsF he results show tht lthough privtized rms do perform etter thn pure yis even efore they re privtizedD the gp enlrges signintly fter privtiztionF o our results re roustF he rest of pper is orgnized s followsF etion P desries the dt nd present desriptive evideneF etion Q disusses our methods of estimtionsF etions R nd S report the empiril results of the xedEeet nd hsh w estimtionD respetivelyF etion T presents the results of the roustness test on the xedEeet resultsF gonlusions re summrized in etion UF 2 Data and Descriptive Evidence 2.1 Data he dt we use re tken from thePHHP gomprehensive urvey of yi eform in ghin4D whih ws jointly rried out y the then tte ionomi nd rde gommission @igAD g nd the snterntionl pinne gorportion @spgA in PHHPF he originl smple ontins TVQ rms tht re loted in II itiesD whih reD from north to southD rrin @IPH rmsAD pushun @II rmsAD ngshn @SW msAD ining @PT rmsAD vnzhou @QW rmsAD eifng @QH rmsAD ghengdu @RR rmsAD quiyng @IRW rmsAD rungshi @UW rmsAD henjing @TW rmsAD R nd rengyng @SU rmsAF ome of these ities re lrge provinil pitlsD nd others re mediumEsize itiesF hetiled informtion out these ities nd survey implementtion n e found in qrnut et lF @PHHSAF pirms were smpled from the yis mnged y eh ity s of the end of IWWSF he yer IWWS ws hosen euse lrgeEsle privtiztion strted in IWWTF ht were reorded for the period IWWSEPHHIF e prolem of the survey is onerned with the seletion ises in the smpling proessF here were two potentil soures of isF yne ws the selfEseletion of the rms in returning the questionnireD nd the other ws the seletion of the ity rnhes of the igD the lol ounterprts tht implemented the surveyF he rst soure is unvoidle in ny survey sed on voluntry prtiiptionD ut hopefully the seletion ws not systemtilly relted to the deision of privtiztionF roweverD the seond soure my ring rel onerns s lol oils might press the rms tht hd loser ties with the governmentD usully the lrger ones nd nonEprivtized yisD to ll the questionnireF his would use overE smpling of nonEprivtized yisF e hve the numer of rms tht were fully owned y the government or ontrolled y the government with mjority shres in eh ity in eh yerD so weighted regressions n e dopted to orret this isF o ommodte dierent methods of regressionD howeverD we hve dopted dierent strtegy to resmple the yis in eh ity y the following methodF vet S it e the rtio of yis to privtized rms in ity i nd yer tD nd let S it e the orresponding rtio in our smpleF yur im is to preserve ll the privtized yis in the new smpleF o for the smple of ity i in yer tD we dene weight for yis ! it a S it = S it D whih n ring the rtio of yis to privtized rms in the new smple to tht of the ity in the sme yer when it is used to resmple the yisF o keep the pnel struture of the dtD howeverD we dene weighted weight for eh ityD P 2001 t=1995 ! it @N it =N i AD in whih N it is S the numer of yis of ity i nd yer t in the smpleD nd N i is the sum of N it from IWWS to PHHIF e then use this weighted weight to resmple the yis of eh ity in yer PHHIF e keep the ses of those smpled yis of eh yer in the new smple nd drop the ses of the other yisF gomining the seleted yis with the privtized rmsD we get new smple of QVT rmsF he distriution of these rms isX rrin @UI rmsAD pushun @T rmsAD ngshn @QS msAD ining @IW rmsAD vnzhou @IQ rmsAD ghengdu @II rmsAD quiyng @SP rmsAD eifng @PU rmsAD rungshi @SP rmsAD henjing @RS rmsAD nd rengyng @SS T e use the numer of onEduty workers to mesure rm9s rel employmentF yverE employment ws mjor prolem for yis in the IWWHs nd ws used y two ftorsF yneD s foykoD hleifer nd ishny @IWWTA theorize in generl settingD lol politiins used employment to gther politil supportsF he other ws tht the performne of yis deteriorted rpidly from the erly IWWH9s onwrds @rung nd wengD IWWUY erkinsD IWWTAD whih led to overpity in yisF his fored yis to downsizeF Jian yuan zeng xiao thus eme prevlent in the IWWHsF roweverD the fer of soil instility prevented rms from lying o workers in the outright mnnerF snstedD two mesures were reted to mitigte the imptsF yne ws xiagangD whih mens tht worker does not work for ftory ut still retins nominl employment sttus with it nd gets prtilly pid with susistene wgeF he other mesure ws internl retirement y whih worker gets retired ut still remins s n employee of the ftoryF es resultD there ws lrge disrepny etween rel employment nd nominl employmentD espeilly for pure yisF hereforeD using the numer of onEduty employees is more pproprite mesure for employmentF pigure P out here pigure P ompres the employment performne of pure yis nd privtized rms over timeF st is ler in the gure tht privtized rms outperformed pure yisF he employment size of pure yis delined onstntly throughout the survey periodD trimming down from n verge of UHH onEduty workers in IWWS to only RHH in PHHIF rivtized rms mintined lrger employment thn pure yis throughout the smple periodF his dierene might e used y privtiztion9s seletion of lrger rmsD so it is more interesting study the growth rtes of the two kinds of rmsF fetween IWWS nd IWWUD the verge size of privtized rms inresedF efter IWWUD they joined in the rnk of pure yis to redue their employmentD ut t slower peF he verge redution rte of pure yis in the period IWWSEPHHI ws U UFP perent per nnumD ut it ws QFV perent per nnum for privtized rms in the period IWWUEPHHIF 3 Econometric Strategies sn ssessing the impt of privtiztion on employmentD we need to mke inferenes out the ounterftul outomes tht ould hve een oserved for privtized rms hd they not een privtizedF ithout rndom experimentD no diret estimte of suh ounterftul outomes is villeF sn this pperD we rely on two eonometri tehniques to otin nerly idel estimtesF yne is the xedEeet pnel model nd the other is the hsh w methodF foth methods re eetive in ontrolling the seletion ises rising from timeEinvrint ftorsF sn dditionD the seond does not rely on the liner funtionl form nd hndles the ontrol group in more preise mnnerF he results of the two methods n e ompred to disover the more roust outomesF es we showed in the lst setionD the level of employment is not good dependent vrile to study s the seletion of privtiztion my e orrelted with itF tudying employment growth rtes is more sensile pprohF roweverD nnul growth rtes re voltile nd my ontin mny noises tht nnot e properly ptured y oserved vrilesF es n lterntiveD we study the xedEse growth rte of employment using IWWS s the se yerF peillyD the employment growth rte of rm i in yer t is the perentge inrese of its numer of onEduty workers etween IWWS nd yer tF 2 2 the growth rate of 1995 is naturally set to zero. V 3.1 Fixed-eect Model king dvntge of our pnel dtD we will estimte the following model with rm nd yer xed eetsX
where Y it is the xed se growth rte of employment of rm i in yer t @t a IWWT; IWWU; ¡ ¡ ¡ ; PHHIAD X it 1 is set of vriles representing rm performne nd nne @lgged y one yerA tht might e orrelted with oth the growth rte of employment nd privtiztionD P it is the privtiztion dummy vrile tht is equl to I if rm i hd nonzero privte shre in yer t nd equl to H if it hd zero privte shreD i is the rm xed eet for rm iD nd I t is the yer xed eet for yer tF he ontrol vriles enter with their lgged vlues to void their ontemporneous orreltions with the dependent vrileF es resultD the time spn for the dependent vrile is from IWWT to PHHIF he rm xed eets ontrol the kind of timeEinvrint rm qulity tht is orrelted with oth ownership nd employment ut is unoserved in our dtF hey extrt timeEinvrint orreltions etween the explntory vriles nd the error termF he yer xed eets ontrol timeEspei ftors tht were orrelted with oth employment nd privtiztion nd ommon to ll rmsF hese ould inlude hnges in mroeonomi onditions s well s government poliies tht eted oth employment nd the pe of privtiztionF he residul it inludes the eets of meE surement nd speition errorsF yur identifying ssumption is tht these omponents re unorrelted with rm ownershipF he oeient of our interest is D the men dierene in employment growth etween privtized rms nd pure yisF ith the set of ontrol vriles X it 1 inludedD eqution @IA is estimting the diret eet of privtiztionF he eets of privtiztion n e tegorized into two setsF yne set inludes those tht n e ptured y improved protility nd nnil positionsF rivE W tiztion ould led to etter performne nd djustments to rm9s nnil onditionsD whih in turn ould led to more employmentF sn prtiulrD two prties in privtiztion re importnt for privtized rm to improve its nnil onditionsF yne is det evsionD nd the other is disounts of privtiztion priesF st hs een found tht some privtized rms set up new identity to move produtive ssets into it nd leve dets in the old rm @qrnut et lFD PHHSAF o exhnge for privtized rms9 onsent to retin more workersD loE l governments re found to give them disounts in privtiztion priesD inluding removing prt or ll of their dets to governmentEowned dummy ompny @qrnut et lFD PHHSAF ith these two prtiesD the nnil onditions of privtized rms re utomtilly imE proved nd employment ould go upF e ll this kind of improvement the indiret eet of privtiztionF he other set of eets is relted to those tht re not ptured y the urrent protility nd nnil performneD ut rther linked to the expettion for fuE ture performneF hese inlude improved rm mngement skills nd inentivesD hnged produt linesD new 8hD nd other improvements whose positive eets tke time to show upF his set of eets is wht we ment y the diret eetF he oeient of the privE tiztion dummy in eqution @IA mesures this eet s the eqution ontrols the indiret eet through the ontrol vrilesF sn ddition to estimting the diret eetD howeverD we re lso interested in the totl eet of privtiztionD whih is the sum of the diret nd indiret eetsF o estimte itD it sues to drop the ontrol vriles X it 1 nd to estimte eqution @IA ginF e lso wnt to investigte the dynmi eets of privtiztionF his mounts to splitE ting the privtiztion dummy in eqution @IA into set of postEprivtiztion yer dummiesX priv 0it @for the yer of privtiztionAD priv 1it @for the rst yer fter privtiztionAD¡ ¡ ¡D nd priv 5it @for the fth yer fter privtiztionAF 3 xturllyD the sum of these six dummies is 3 The rst year of privatization in our sample is 1996, so the maximum number of post-privatization years IH equl to the privtiztion dummyF e then estimte the following model to get the diret eets of privtiztionX Y it a X it 1 C¥ 0 priv 0it C¥ 1 priv 1it C¥ 2 priv 2it C¥ 3 priv 3it C¥ 4 priv 4it C¥ 5 priv 5it C i CI t C it ; @PA where ¥ 0 mesures the verge eet of privtiztion for the yer of privtiztionD ¥ 1 the verge eet for the rst yer fter privtiztionD etF his model will help us get sense on the speed with whih the estimted eet oursX ss the eet immedite or grdulc ss it only temporryD or permnentc vike in the se of estimting the verge eetD we will lso drop the ontrol vriles X it 1 nd estimte @PA gin to otin the totl eets of privtiztionF 3.2 DID PSM Estimation he tretment group in our w estimtion is dened s the rmEyer oservtions of privtized rms fter they were privtizedD nd the ontrol group is dened s the rmEyer oservtions of rms tht hd not een privtized till the end of PHHIF hus denedD there re ISR oservtions in the tretment group nd IQWP oservtions in the ontrol groupF yne prolem rising from this denition is tht one needs to worry out the rm spei eets in the estimtion of the propensity soresF por thtD we estimte the following rndomEeet logit modelX 4 P it a Z it 1 C v i C e it ; @QA where P it is dened s in eqution @IAD Z it 1 is set of vriles tht predit the proility of privtiztionD v i is the rndom eet of rm iD nd e it is n iFiFd error termF feuse privtiztion is nonreversile proessD we only inlude the ses of the privtiztion yer is 5. 4 Our panel is relatively short so a xed-eect logit model cannot be consistently estimated.
II for the privtized rmsF he propensity sore for eh oservtion is then estimted y ssuming tht Ev i a HF le I out here pollowing rekmnD shimurD mithD nd odd @IWWUD IWWVAD we dopt the diereneE inEdierene @hshA estimtor to estimte the eets of privtiztion nd use the kernelE weighted weights in the mthingF he estimtion is it triky euse privtiztion hppened in dierent yersF yne wy is to estimte the dynmi eets of privtiztion tht eqution @PA tries to estimteF le I illustrtes the wy tht oservtions re mthed nd the eets re estimtedF sn the tleD T 0 is the lendr yer efore tretment @iFeFD privtiztionAD nd T 1 is the lendr yer fter tretmentF por the tretment groupD T 0 is lwys the yer efore privtiztionF st vries from rm to rm euse privtiztion hppened in dierent yersF T 1 then is the order of yer fter privtiztion for whih the eet is estimtedF por the ontrol groupD T 0 is ny yer etween IWWS nd PHHHD nd T 1 is T 0 C k C I s long s it does not exeed PHHID where k is the order of yer for whih the eet of privtiztion is estimtedF hen the hsh w estimtor for the eet of the kth yer fter privtiztion is given y k a I
W ij @Y k1j Y k0j A; @RA sn the equtionD P k is the numer of oservtions tht remin in the tretment group for the kth @k a H; I; P; ¡ ¡ ¡ ; SA yer fter privtiztionD NP k is the orresponding numer of oservtions tht remin in the ontrol groupY Y 0i is the employment growth rte of the ith rm of the tretment group in the yer efore it ws privtizedD Y k1i is its employment growth rte in the kth yer fter privtiztionD Y H k0j nd Y H k1j re the employment growth rtes of the jth rm of the ontrol group with intervl of k C I yersY nd lstlyD W ij is the IP kernelEweighted weight of the jth rm in the ontrol group reltive to the ith rm in the tretment groupF 5 hus denedD the hsh w estimtor hat k is in ft the verge eet of the kth yer fter privtiztion sed on the performne of rms privtized in dierent yersF 4 Results of the Fixed-eect Model sn this setionD we report the estimted impt of privtiztion on employment using xedE eet modelF e strt with the si results from the estimtion of the verge privtiztion eet F xext we report our estimtes of the dynmis for ve yers fter the privtiztionF 4.1 Control Variables fefore presenting the eonometri resultsD we provide short desription of the ontrol vrilesF hese vriles n e divided into four groupsF he rst is onerned with rm9s performneD the seond its employment onditionsD the third its nnil onditionsD nd the fourth industry nd ity hrteristisF sn the rst groupD we hve inluded rm protility @eforeEtx prot divided y the gross vlue of ssetsAD 6 lor produtivity @sles revenue divided y the numer of onEduty workersD in PHHI yun using the gs s the detorAD unit ost @mteril osts divided y sles revenueAD investment rte @new investment divided y the gross vlue of ssetsAD nd the mount of outside stte shresF xturllyD we expet tht rms with higher rte of protilityD higher lor produtivityD lower unit ostD nd higher investment rte would hieve higher employment growthF he vrile of outside stte shres is inluded euse it is found tht outside stte shres improve rm performne either y ringing in pitl or y hnging the inentive shemes in the rm @ong nd oD PHHTAF 5 The formula for W ij can be found in Heckman et al. (1998) . 6 We use the gross value of assets, not the net value, because many rms had negative net values.
IQ sn the seond group of ontrol vrilesD we hve inluded three vrilesX verge wge @totl wge pyroll divided y the numer of onEduty workersD in PHHI yun using the produer prie index s the detorAD 7 redundny rte @the totl numer of textitxigng workersD internlly retired workersD nd oilly retired workers divided y the numer of onEduty workersAD 8 nd pitl perEworker @the gross vlue of ssets divided y the numer of onEduty workersD in PHHI yun using the produer prie index s the detorAF 9 st is nturl to expet tht higher verge wge @higher lor ostA nd redundny rte redue employment growth rteF sn dditionD pitl perEworker ptures the weight4 of rmF wny yis re overEweighted4 in the sense tht they hve dopted too pitlEintensive tehnologiesD whih prevents them from soring more workersF o we expet tht more pitl perEworker retrds employment growthF he third group of ontrol vriles lso inludes three vrilesX detsGssets rtio @the mount of ommeril nd nk dets divided y the gross vlue of ssetsAD nk dues @the mount of new overdue nk lons nd interests divided y the gross vlue of ssetsAD nd tx dues @new overdue txes divided y the gross vlue of ssetsAF he detsGssets rtio reets rm9s generl nnil onditionsD nd nk dues nd tx dues reet rm9s udget onstrint with respet to nk orrowing nd its reltionship with the governmentF oft udget onstrints with the nk nd the government re results of d performneF st is then nturl to expet tht worsening nnil onditions represented y the three vriles would result in slower employment growthF 7 This denition exaggerates the average wage paid to on-duty workers as rms also pay their textitxiagang and internally retired workers. On the other hand, using the average wage paid to all the workers underestimates the average wage paid to on-duty workers. Since worker redundancy is high (Figure 2 ), our calculation of the average wage is a sensible way to characterize the labor cost of on-duty workers.
8 Ocially retired workers are counted as redundant workers as in many cases they are not covered by the public retirement scheme and still paid by their factories. This is especially true for rms in the privatization process. See Garnaut et al. (2005) for detailed discussion.
9 Our survey did not record the value of xed capital, so here we use the gross value of assets. The correlation between these two values is high as xed capital is the largest component of assets in most rms.
IR he lst group of ontrol vriles is set of industril nd ity dummies tht im t ontrolling industril nd ity spei eetsF hey do not pper in the xedEeet pnel estimtion for ovious resons ut pper in the logit model for mthingF elthough the industril overge of the smple rms is lrgeD the numer of rms in eh industry would e smll if we use the twoEdigit industries to lssify the smple rmsF snstedD we group the smple rms into IH industriesF le P out here ummry sttistis of the ontrol vriles s well s the dependent vrile nd the privtiztion dummies re presented in the rst pnel of le PF he tle lso mkes omprison etween privtized rms nd pure yisF yn vergeD privtized rms outE performed pure yis in protilityD lor produtivityD nd unit ostD nd lso hd more outside stte shresF roweverD privtized rms hd lower investment rte thn pure yisF sn terms of employment onditionsD privtized rms were muh 4lighter4D hd smller reE dundny rteD ut pid higher wge thn pure yisF he ghinese lor mrket is not fully ompetitive so wge my e orrelted with rm performneF e will keep this in mind when we interpret our empiril resultsF vstlyD privtized rms performed muh etter thn pure yis in terms of dets nd nk duesF sn ontrstD they hd more overdue txes thn pure yisF st seems tht privtiztion hs hrdened rms9 udget onstrints with respet to nk orrowing nd ommeril delsD ut hs done nothing or even worsened rms9 udget onstrint with respet to the governmentF 4.2 Average Eect of Privatization on Employment he estimtion results of eqution @IA re presented in the rst two olumns of le QF he tEsttistis re lulted using the roust stndrd errorsF golumn I presents the results
IS
for the totl eet of privtiztionF st is shown tht on vergeD privtiztion inreses the numer of onEduty workers y IUFTS perent over the se yer of IWWSD with tEsttisti TFSQF his is very lrge eet euse it is equivlent to RI perent of the rte of employment redution in pure yis in the period IWWSEPHHIF golumn P presents the results for the diret eet of privtiztionF he diret eet is IIFRW perentD whih is smller thn the totl eetD ut remins signintF his mens tht privtiztion does hve n indiret eet on employment through improvements mde to rm9s performne nd nnil onditionsF le Q out here emong the performne vrilesD protility nd outside stte shres inrese emE ployment growthF roweverD oth eets re not very lrgeX one perentge inrese of them inreses employment y HFIU perent nd HFIS perentD respetivelyD oth over the IWWS levelF xeverthelessD the positive eet of outside stte shres still lls for ttentionF yne possile reson is tht outside yis re more ple thn privte owners to ring in pitl to the rm euse yis re fvored y nks in mking lonsF roweverD more reserh is needed to nd out the ext reson ehind this resultF he prdoxil result is tht lor produtivity hs negtive oeient tht is mrginlly signint t the IH perent signine levelF roweverD it my e spurious result rising from the denition of lor produtivity whih is revenue per onEduty workerF vstlyD investment rte nd unit ost re not signintF es for the vriles representing employment onditionsD verge wge nd perEworker pitl signintly redue employment lthough neither eet is eonomilly strongF orker redundny is not found to hve signint eet on employment growthF IT e higher detsGssets rtio slows down employment growthF fut ginD the eet is not eonomilly strong s one perentge inrese of the rtio only rings down employment growth y HFHQ perentge pointsF he two vriles for softEudget onstrints with the nk nd the government re highly insignintD thoughF 4.3 Dynamic Impacts of Privatization e turn next to the dynmi eets of privtiztionF sn olumns Q nd R of le P we report the estimted results for the totl nd diret dynmi eets of privtiztionD respeE tivelyF emong the ontrol vrilesD protilityD perEworker pitlD nd detsGssets rtio hve kept their signs nd remined signint while lor produtivityD outside stte shresD nd verge wge hve turned insignintF ell the other ontrol vriles hve remined insignintF he totl eets of privtiztion re strong s ll the six privtiztion dummies in olumn Q re highly signint nd their oeients re eonomilly strongF gompred with n yi of the sme size in IWWSD n verge privtized rm hs n employment size IRFP perent lrger in the yer when privtiztion hppensF he eet inreses s time psses nd peks t PUFQ perent in the Rth yer fter privtiztion hppensF st delines to PQFS perent in the Sth yerD thoughF he diret eets shown in golumn R follow the sme pttern s tht of the totl eetsD leit ll with slightly smller mgnitudesF hese results indite tht the positive eets of privtiztion on employment re not only immediteD ut lso persist for resonly long time periodF 5 DID PSM Estimations he ruil step in using w is estimting the propensity soreF reneD the underlining priniple to hoose suitle speition of the prtiiption eqution is tht vriles tht inuene simultneously the prtiiption deision nd outome should e inluded IU @rekmnD shimur nd oddD IWWUAF st should lso e ler tht only preEintervention vriles tht re not inuened y privtiztion should e inluded in the regression @tln nd vllionD PHHQAF he existing literture shows tht rm performneD employment onditionsD nd nnil positions ll inuene the privtiztion deision @u nd teersonD PHHQY frndt et lF PHHSY nd quo nd oD PHHSAF his leds us to inlude ll the onE trol vriles of the xedEeet model in the logit estimtion of privtiztionF es eforeD these vriles enter the regression with their oneEyer lgged vluesF sn dditionD we hve inluded ityD industril nd yer dummy vriles to ontrol unoserved ity nd industril hrteristis s well s hnges of government poliy over timeF o stisfy the lne testD we hve inluded squres of some vriles following mith nd odd @PHHSAF es eing disussed eforeD we only inlude in the tretment group the rmEyer oE servtions of privtized rms in the yer when they were privtizedF sn the mentimeD ll the rmEyer oservtions of rms tht remined s pure yis s of PHHP re in the ontrol groupF his leves us with smple of ISHH rms in whih ISR re in the tretment group nd the rest in the ontrol groupF es eing indited eforeD rndom eet model is used in the logit estimtionF le R out here he results of the estimtion re reported in le RF elthough signint estimtes re sntD the model provides reltively good predition rtesF redition rtes re emphsized y rekmn nd mith @IWWWA nd rs @IWWVA s hek for the qulity of the speition to seprte the treted nd ontrol groupsF e ommon prtie to ssess orret preditions is to use the frtion of the treted sujets in the totl numer of oservtions s the uto vlue for the predited proilityF his uto vlue for our smple is HFIHQF sing this vlueD we nd tht the predition rtes for the tretment nd ontrol groups re UTFP IV perent nd URFU perentD respetivelyF o it turns out tht our propensity model is good preditor of prtiiptionF por the w to e vlid to mth the tretment nd ontrol groupsD we need to mke sure tht our estimtion stises the gse nd ommon support onditionsF e use the lning test proposed y osenum nd uin @IWVQA to exmine whether the propensity model hs een dequtely speied to lne the ovrites inluded in the speitionF here re severl pprohes to rry out suh testD nd the si ide of them is to ompre the sitution efore nd fter mthing nd hek if there remin ny dierenes fter onditioning on propensity soresF sf there re dierenesD it then suggests tht either the model is misEspeied or there is filure of the gse @mith nd oddD PHHSAF sn our pperD we follow inesi@PHHRA to do the lne test y ompring the pseudoER 2 9s efore nd fter mthingF e nd tht efore mthing the pseudoER 2 is HFPQR nd fter mthing it is HFHPSF 10 ht isD onditionl on the propensity soreD the vriles inluded in the regression n not provide new informtion out the tretment deisionF he men propensity sore for the privtized rms is HFRIV @with stndrd devition of HFQTHA while the men sore for pure yis is HFHVT @with stndrd devition of HFISVAF pigure Q plots the histogrms of the estimted propensity sores for privtized rms nd pure yis to hek the ommon support onditionF here re regions where the two histogrms do not overlpF e thus exlude the privtized rms in the nonEoverlpped region in our mthing exeriseD nd there re IU suh privtized rmsF pigure Q out here le S presents the hsh w estimtes for the dynmi eets of privtiztion sed on eqution @SAF hese estimtes re ll sttistilly signint exept the one for the yer 10 We re-estimate the propensity score on the matched sample, that is only on pure SOEs and matched privatized rms, and get the pseudo-R 2 after matching.
IW of privtiztionF roweverD their mgnitudes re onsiderly smller thn either the totl or the diret eets produed y the xedEeet pnel estimtionF xeverthelessD they follow the sme time pttern s the xedEeet resultsD tht isD the eet of privtiztion inreses nd peks in the Rth yer fter privtiztionD ut egins to derese in the Sth yer fter privtiztionF sn dditionD the w eets re still very strongF fy the Rth yer fter privtiztionD the xedEsed employment growth rte of privtized rms is higher thn tht of pure yis y IWFT perentge pointsF le S out here 6 Robustness Test here is possiility tht privtized rms lid o more workers thn pure yis efore they were privtized so they do not need to ly o workers fter privtiztionF sn other wordsD there is morl hzrd prolemF vyo is ostly for rms s they need to mke ompenstions to lidEo workers @qrnut et lFD PHHSAF sf he ntiipted tht the rm would e soon privtized nd he would e the new ownerD the rm mnger would ly o workers efore privtiztion to sve the ompenstions tht he hd to py out of his own poket fter privtiztionF sf suh rgument is trueD this rises the prolem tht the eets of privtiztion re exggerted y oth our xedEeet pnel model nd the w estimtionF o hndle this prolemD we perform roustness test y dding in eqution @PA dummies of preEprivtiztion yers for the privtized rmsF sf privtized rms lid o workers quiker thn pure yis efore privtiztion hppenedD the estimtes for the preE privtiztion dummies should e signintly negtiveF xotie tht the sum of the preE nd postE privtiztion dummies equls extly the rm dummy for privtized rmsD so the xedEeet estimtion nnot e rried outF snstedD we estimte eqution @PA y the yv PH tehniqueF pigure R out here foth the totl nd diret eets of privtiztion re estimtedF snsted of presenting the full set of results of the two regressionsD thoughD we grph the estimtes for the privtiztion dummies in pigure RF he horizontl xis is the numer of yers reltive to the privtiztion yerD nd the vertil xis is the estimted eetF yur dt llow us to hve S yers eh efore nd fter privtiztionF he grph shows tht oth the totl nd the diret eets re lwys positive nd inrese long the horizontl xisF he estimtes of the totl eets re ll sttistilly signint exept for the Rth nd Sth yer efore privtiztionF es for the diret eetsD ll ut the estimtes of the Pnd nd Qrd yers efore privtiztion nd the Rth nd Sth yers fter privtiztion re signintF hese results show tht the morl hzrd prolem does not exist in privtized rms9 deision of employment efore privtiztion hppensF roweverD the results shown in pigure R my reet seletion is in privtiztionD tht isD rms with etter prosperity of employment growth re privtized rstF hile our erlier xedEeet nd w estimtions hve resonly ontrolled this prolemD we further notie tht there is n immedite jump of performne fter privtiztion in pigure RD whih suggests tht something more thn seletion ises is t work nd tht privtiztion hs rel impt on employmentF 7 Conclusion sn this pperD we hve empirilly exmined the impt of privtiztion on rms9 employment in ghin y employing unique set of survey dtF he xedEeet pnel model shows tht privtiztion on verge rises the xedEse employment growth rte y IUFU perentge PI pointsF he ontriution of privtiztion remins t IIFS perentge points even when rm performneD employment onditionsD nd nnil positions re ontrolled forF e further nd tht privtiztion hs longElsting eets on employment growth fter privtiztionF e lso use the hsh w method to relx the ssumption of liner funtionl form used in the xedEeet model nd reweigh the oservtions over the ommon supportF sts results reinfore the xedEeet resultsF yur roustness test refuses the morl hzrd hypothesis tht privtized rms ly o more workers thn pure yis efore privtiztion hppensF o the eets tht we hve found re not outomes of rms9 strtegi movesD ut re the rel impts of privtiztionF hese results possess strong implitions for the poliy dete in ghin regrding the role of privtiztion in mssive unemploymentF foth old nd privtized yis were losing employment in the lte IWWHs nd erly PHHHsD ut our results show tht privtized yis mintined signintly smller redution rte thn pure yisF st is therefore wrong to use privtiztion of using ghin9s mssive unemploymentF henD wht re the resons for privtized rms9 etter performnec e elieve tht two ftors re t work hereF he rst is tht privtiztion improves rm protilityD nnil stneD nd employment onditionsD so rms re le to retin more workersF his ftor my e wekened y the ft tht privtized rms get fvorle tretments from the nk nd the government so their nnil onditions re improved utomtilly @qrnut et lFD PHHSAD ut there is lso evidene for true eieny improvements @eFgFD qrnut et lFD PHHTAF he seond ftor is relted to the expettion of the mngementF he ft tht he uys the rm shows tht the new owner of the rmD no mtter he is the old mnger or n outside investorD hs fith in the rm9s futureF his optimism n led to higher employment rteF sn dditionD the new owner my introdue tehnologil nd mngeril PP hnges to the rmD ut the eets of these hnges tke time to show up nd nnot e dequtely ounted for y urrent rm ttriutesF yur estimte of the diret eet of privtiztion ptures this kind of expettionErelted eetsF yne remining question is how one explins the mssive unemployment in ghin in the lte IWWHs nd erly PHHHsF elthough the ext uses need reful nlysis to nd outD here we provide two tenttive explntionsF pirstD it ws result of the struturl djustment in the yi setorF his inluded losing down unvile rms @espeilly those in the resoure industriesA nd utting the overpities in ertin industries @notiely the textile industryAF e se t point is pushunD smple ity in this studyF st ws mining ity tht rn out of ol in the midEIWWHsF he djustment ws pinful proess for the ity nd its unemployment rte rehed RH peent in PHHIF roweverD the privtiztion rte in pushun ws mong the lowest in the II smple ities @ount RS perent in PHHIAF eondD mssive unemployment ws lso relted to the jianyuan zengxiao poliy dopted y the yisF sn the * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Observations 1500
Number of eid 370
Log likelihood -271.7
Note: As for estimation of propensity score, we only include in the treatment group the firm-year observations of privatized firms in the year when they were privatized. And all the firm-year observations of firms that remained as pure SOEs until 2001 are in the control group.
All independent variables are 1 year lagged. Results for industrial, city and year dummy variables are not shown.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
